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Existing theories of television often emphasize the inherently private nature of the 
medium: its propensity for personal narratives, its modes of address, and its centrality 
to domestic life. Yet, is this perception of television universally applicable? As this article 
argues, state socialist television was marked by a different relationship with the private–
public boundary, rooted in the public thrust of the communist vision of modern society. 
Although television became a medium consumed in the comfort of one’s home, the 
narratives it offered were rarely centered exclusively on the private realm and often 
privileged communal and public values. The nature of televised representations of 
privacy in the socialist world also changed over time and differed across countries, with 
some countries markedly more open to depictions of privacy than others. This is 
demonstrated through a longitudinal and comparative investigation of domestic serial 
fiction covering the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The results suggest that theories of 
television need to pay more attention to the multiple forms of modern television cultures 
globally, anchored in competing visions of modern society. 
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At first sight, state socialism may seem an odd choice for an inquiry into private life. The utopian 
vision of a communist future left little room for private matters. As individuals regained control over the 
means of production and overcame the alienation generated by capitalism, went the argument, the need 
for privacy would disappear. In line with this vision, communist-led states are said to have had little 
respect for the privacy of their citizens—a point noted in several canonical theories of totalitarianism. As 
Arendt argued in Origins of Totalitarianism, totalitarian bureaucracy sought not only to destroy the public 
realm but also “intruded upon the private individual and his inner life with equal brutality. The result of 
this radical efficiency has been that the inner spontaneity of people under its rule was killed along with 
their social and political activities” (Arendt, 1951/1976, p. 253). A sizeable scholarly literature examining 
the pervasive infiltration of the state and its security apparatus into the private lives of citizens lends 
further support to this view (e.g., Hornsby, 2013; Miller, 1999; Verdery, 2014). As a result, state 
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socialism is often seen as a political regime that demanded a complete subordination of personal interests 
to public goals and, hence, severely limited the scope of privacy.  
 
Yet, recent research has gathered substantial evidence suggesting that the ubiquitous forms of 
state control did not wipe out the private sphere altogether, and that in some cases the party-state itself 
encouraged investment in individual and family-oriented activities and spaces. The final decades of 
Communist Party rule saw a recalibration of the relationship between public and private life and a gradual 
or partial withdrawal from public matters to private concerns (e.g., Betts, 2010; Field, 2007; Siegelbaum, 
2006). In the Soviet Union, the seven-year economic plan adopted in 1959 promised to raise the living 
standards of Soviet citizens by improving the provision of consumer goods and access to private 
apartments; the mass housing campaign, launched in 1957, enabled 38 million Soviet families to move to 
new apartments by 1970, prompting profound changes in domestic life (e.g., Harris, 2006). Similar 
changes occurred elsewhere in the communist world.  
 
Changes in leisure practices, including the growth of television viewing, have also been identified 
as an integral part of this retreat from public life: a symptom of the broader depoliticization of socialist 
societies, rooted in the changing nature of Communist rule, as well as a contributing factor that helped 
foster political apathy among citizens. As Kristin Roth-Ey (2011) suggests in her study of Soviet mass 
media, the adoption of domestic television gave rise to a cultural experience that was incompatible with 
Soviet cultural ideas and diminished the capacity of Soviet culture to act as a mobilizational tool. In a 
manner reminiscent of arguments about the effects of television on public engagement in the United 
States (e.g., Putnam, 1995; M. J. Robinson, 1976), Roth-Ey argues that by the late 1980s, Soviet mass 
culture, with television at its core, was no longer able to inspire and mobilize audiences, and had instead 
turned into a conduit of “experiences and ways of being in the world unconnected to broader political 
projects of any kind” (p. 24). Examining television in post-1968 Czechoslovakia, Paulina Bren (2010) 
reaches a similar conclusion, pointing to the depoliticizing effects of popular television series. Bren argues 
that in the politically stringent atmosphere following the Soviet invasion in 1968, these series acted as 
vehicles of “privatized citizenship,” emphasizing the primacy of family life, leisure and intimate 
relationships over politics and civic engagement. 
 
What emerges from the discussion so far is a perception of socialist television as an inherently 
privatizing force, which facilitated a decline in public engagement and a retreat into domesticity. Yet, such 
an interpretation is too quick to assume that the domesticity and privacy of television was accepted 
without resistance, and that it worked in favor of the Communist elites, which found a politically 
withdrawn, apathetic population easier to manage. As we show in this article, the relationship between 
television, the private sphere, and Communist rule was more complicated, varying from country to 
country, as well as over time. To demonstrate this, we conducted a longitudinal and comparative 
investigation of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, focusing on depictions of privacy in domestically 
produced serial fiction, a genre that has a particular affinity with private life and attracted top audience 
ratings. 
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Privacy, Personal Life, and Television 
 
The category of private is used in a wide variety of senses, linked to considerably different 
understandings of the social location of things considered “private” and their relationship to things 
considered “public” (Rossler, 2005; Sheller & Urry, 2003). Private interests, for instance, are typically 
associated with individuals, families, or commercial enterprises and corporations, and contrasted with 
public interests defended by the state. By contrast, private life is associated with individuals and families, 
and excludes the realm of the economy as well as politics. Any attempt to develop a universally applicable 
distinction between the private and the public is complicated further by the divergent criteria used to 
assess the degree of privacy/publicity. According to Weintraub (1997), two such criteria can be 
distinguished: The first one associates the public with visibility; the second associates it with collectivity. 
Although the two often coincide, this is not necessarily so: A group pursuing individual interests can do so 
in public view. To capture the varied meanings of privacy, Rossler (2005, pp. 5–6) links privacy to control 
of access, and argues that “something counts as private if one can oneself control the access to this 
‘something’” (p. 8). In this sense, no space, mode of action, or type of information can be seen as 
inherently private. Rather, privacy is a particular state or quality that different spaces, actions, or types of 
information may or may not possess.  
 
The notion of privacy as something an individual can control does not fare particularly well in the 
socialist context. The varied forms of surveillance and the widely cast webs of unofficial informants made 
personal life more open to state scrutiny and diminished the scope of individual control (Betts, 2010). 
Moreover, although socialist citizens gradually moved out of collective apartments into single-family 
homes, typical socialist dwellings were more standardized and more exposed to the prying gaze of 
neighbors and authorities than their counterparts in the West (Harris, 2006). The numerous official 
publications also clearly signaled that personal life, although acknowledged as an important element of 
socialist existence, in many ways remained a profoundly public matter (Reid, 2009).  
 
We should therefore acknowledge that despite the gradual acceptance of privacy as a legitimate 
part of socialist societies, the private–public boundary remained blurred. Rather than giving rise to a 
separate private realm, neatly separated from public life, the shift to privacy in the latter decades of 
communist rule led to the growth of hybrid forms of public privacy and private publicity as discussed by 
Gerasimova (2002). The former encompasses instances in which the Communist Party allowed aspects of 
privacy such as personal life as a family member, but sought to retain a measure of control over them by 
seeking to prescribe acceptable forms of privacy. Collective apartments offer a case in point: Here, 
personal life was open to the scrutiny of neighbors and spaces were organized in ways that encouraged 
collaboration. Private publicity, on the other hand, refers to forms of publicity emerging in private realms 
that were beyond the reach of the party, such as discussions of public matters in family homes.  
 
How did the peculiar nature of privacy in the socialist world intersect with the mass media, and, 
more specifically, with television? Television has been repeatedly singled out as a medium inherently 
drawn to personal matters. Television’s visual character, the one-to-many mode of communication it 
engenders, the domestic context of viewing, and the temporal organization of its programming have been 
linked to a distinctly personal or intimate nature of its content and forms. Meyrowitz (1985), for instance, 
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argues that television’s focus on nonverbal messages, such as gestures and appearance, has meant that 
“a politician’s demeanor on television is often more important than his political programs” (p. 100). In his 
study of the rise of “the intimate society,” Sennett (1977) likewise associates television with the growth of 
personality politics. Due to audience size and the lack of interactivity, a politician giving a speech on 
television needs to treat the addressees in abstract terms, which leads to an avoidance of ideological 
issues and a focus on the politician’s personality, trustworthiness, and so forth. The centrality of 
personality on television is also at the core of Horton and Wohl’s (1956) classic study of parasocial 
relationships. Such relationships, they argue, are based on an “illusion of intimacy” between the media 
personality and the spectator, rooted in the visual nature of the medium.  
 
Horton and Wohl (1956) highlight the repetitive nature of television programming and the 
tendency of television personalities to enter spectators’ homes at regular intervals, as is the case with 
one’s friends and relatives. More recent literature likewise highlights the link between the personal nature 
of television content and the temporal organization of television programming. According to Scannell 
(1996), television’s connection with the unfolding present gives rise to the structuring of programming as 
a continuous flow, which becomes interwoven with the temporal organization of domestic lives. This 
constant interweaving with the personal sphere also has had an effect on television’s mode of address and 
genre conventions. Serial fiction, in particular, evolved in close conjunction with the domesticity of 
television viewing, and relies on audience’s sense of intimate connection with the lives of characters, who 
live their lives in parallel with theirs (cf. Geraghty, 1981). The inherently intimate nature of the television 
series also has led to an intimization of its content: Even if a series focuses on public themes such as 
crime or politics, the story is typically told through narratives focusing on personal lives (Creeber, 2001).  
 
It is important to note that the theorizing of television as a medium drawn to the private does not 
preclude acknowledgment of its public functions. Indeed, television is regularly seen as a medium central 
to public life (e.g., Corner, 1995; Dahlgren, 1995). Yet, this public function is predicated on the ability of 
television to make physical travel into the outside world unnecessary, and instead to bring public life into 
private homes, thereby enabling TV viewers, as Moores (2000) puts it, to combine “staying at home” and 
“going places” (p. 96). This hybrid, at once public and private nature of television is captured in Raymond 
Williams’ (1974/2003) discussion of “mobile privatization,” coined to describe a situation in which humans, 
while living in a world of unprecedented mobility, increasingly function in self-enclosed family units, 
removed from places of work and government. This particular condition, argues Williams, created a need 
for new kinds of communication, capable of bringing news or entertainment from otherwise inaccessible 
sources into private homes—a need fulfilled first by radio, then by television. Thus, television—at least as 
it developed in the context of industrial capitalism—was not simply an inherently private medium, but 
rather a medium capable of bridging the distinctive divide between public and private worlds characteristic 
of modern urban living.  
 
How did the inherently personal features of television, and its ability to bring public messages 
into private homes, fare in the context of a political system that gradually acknowledged the legitimacy of 
domestic life, but also required citizens to abandon their private enclaves to participate in communal life? 
Could television in such a context be equally intimate and domesticated as its Western sibling? Some of 
the existing research seems to suggest that this was indeed the case. As noted in the introduction, Roth-
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Ey (2011) shows that Soviet television became associated primarily with domestic viewing, and Bren’s 
(2010) analysis of Czechoslovak television examines how the popular serial dramas of the era, centered 
on everyday life, fostered a retreat into “privatized citizenship.” Research on the German Democratic 
Republic likewise suggests that during the 1970s and the 1980s, East German television sought to 
promote private values through TV drama (Pfau, 2009). On the other hand, however, a recent study of 
Yugoslav television (Mihelj, 2013) suggests that the relationship between television and privacy changed 
over time, as did its involvement with wider social changes. 
 
In this article, we offer a more detailed examination of televised representations of personal life 
in state socialist societies. We argue that in the socialist context, televised privacy was often closely 
intertwined with public values, but also that it had ambiguous consequences for Communist rule. On the 
one hand, television offered a means of promoting a form of public privacy—that is, an acceptable form of 
private life, in which individual interests were subordinated to communal goals. The potential to use 
television to showcase a model form of socialist privacy also meant that the production of such dramas 
could receive political backing even in contexts in which the party grip over public and private life was 
stronger. On the other hand, televised representations of privacy could reveal facets of personal life that 
were out of tune with communist ideals or reveal the limits of party control over personal matters. Due to 
this, the relationship between Communist rule and televised privacy changed over time and differed 
across countries.  
 
Method 
 
The two case studies examined here—the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—are in many ways 
unusual, and arguably represent two polar opposites of socialist rule and two very different forms of 
socialist television. Yugoslavia followed its own path into socialism early on, and sought to position itself 
as a country that was aligned with neither the socialist block nor the capitalist world. The Soviet Union, on 
the other hand, was a model socialist country, which saw itself as the polar opposite of the capitalist 
world. The media and their relationships with political control differed as well: Soviet media were 
subjected to greater political control than Yugoslav media, and Soviet television fiction was more inclined 
to focus on public narratives such as spy thrillers and historical war dramas (Lovell, 2013; Prokhorova, 
2003). Yet, it is precisely this unusual position that makes the two countries particularly suitable for our 
inquiry: As two extreme articulations of socialism, they enable us to reflect on the shared traits and 
distinctive features of socialist television.  
 
The decision to focus on television series was motivated by the already-noted intimate nature of 
the genre, but also by its popularity with audiences. The vast majority of serial fiction was scheduled 
during prime time, and records from the period suggest that several series were viewed by more than 
80% of the population with access to television (e.g., Radio-televizija Zagreb, 1982). Let us also note that 
the label series is used here in a generic sense, and is meant to encompass different forms of serial 
fiction, ranging from sitcoms to family and war dramas.  
 
The analysis of the series combines two methods: content analysis of all domestic serial fiction 
and qualitative case studies of two selected shows. Content analysis was used to identify the relative 
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prominence of serial drama focused on personal life and to establish changes over time. The logic of such 
a procedure was as follows: First, if it is the case that privacy was at odds with communist ideals, then it 
is feasible to expect relatively low levels of dramas focused on the private in both countries. Second, one 
would expect Yugoslav television—as more politically liberalized and more open to Western influence—to 
be more open to dramatizations of the private than Soviet television. Finally, if it is true that dramas of 
private life served to facilitate a retreat into privacy when political control over the public realm increased, 
then one would expect the proportion of serial fiction centered on private life to be higher when the 
political grip over public spaces was tighter.  
 
To identify serial dramas focused on personal life, we used two separate measurements: (a) the 
relative prominence of domestic and public settings and (b) the relative prominence of personal and public 
plots. Domestic settings include apartments and houses, holiday houses, peasant dwellings, and collective 
apartments; public settings cover party organs, security organs, assemblies, courts, workplaces, 
battlefields, universities and schools, parks, concert halls, restaurants, pubs, and cafes. Personal plots 
include narratives focused on love and intimate relationships, family themes, and relationships with 
friends and neighbors; public plots include narratives focused on fighting internal or external enemies, 
labor, and student life. Two most prominent plots were identified for each series. Based on this, the series 
were divided into those focused predominantly on personal plots, those containing mixed personal and 
public plots, and those focused mostly on public plots. Settings were coded using the same procedure. The 
recognition of multiple plots and settings was important; as shown by Reifova, Bednařík, and Dominik 
(2013) in their analysis of a Czechoslovak television serial produced in the 1970s, the personal plot can be 
subordinated to the public plot, and in fact functions as a means of enhancing a political message rather 
than fostering a focus on privacy.  
  
The coding was based on descriptions published in TV guides, supplemented by information 
collected from other published sources or a brief scanning of the series, where available. The coding 
covered programs broadcast by the two main channels of Central Television in the Soviet Union, and the 
two main channels of TV Belgrade and TV Zagreb in Yugoslavia. All domestic series broadcast between 
1959 and 1991 were covered. (However, given the low numbers of programs produced in the early years, 
the analysis of longitudinal trends is limited to the period when the number of series per year reached 
five—from 1971 for the Soviet Union and from 1965 for Yugoslavia.) 
 
An intercoder reliability test was conducted based on a randomly selected subset of 50 series for 
each country, coded by two reliability coders, using the online tool ReCal. Cohen’s kappa and 
Krippendorff’s alpha were chosen as indices because they are commonly used in cases involving two 
coders and nominal variables. The results indicated a good level of agreement for both variables for 
Yugoslavia (setting: 90%,  = .83,  = .83; plot: 86%, = .80,  = .80) and for setting for the USSR 
(88%,  = .83,  = .83), but somewhat lower level of agreement for plot for the USSR (84%,  = .72,  = 
.72). The latter was due to misunderstandings arising from the external coder’s lack of specialist 
knowledge. The results derived from the main sample were therefore judged to be sufficiently reliable. 
 
Of course, quantitative results can tell us only so much. They cannot reveal the actual nature of 
privacy depicted on screen, nor can they tell us whether it was in tune with communist ideals of 
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domesticity and personal relationships. To tackle this, we complemented quantitative analysis with two 
qualitative case studies of dramas focused predominantly on the private: the Yugoslav series Theatre in 
the House (Pozorište u kuči, TV Belgrade, 1972–1984) and the Soviet series Day After Day (Den’ za dnëm, 
Gosteleradio, 1971). 
 
Before turning to television series analysis, we first outline the historical context in which Soviet 
and Yugoslav television evolved, noting key differences between the countries and changes over time. 
 
Soviet and Yugoslav Television in Historical Context 
 
From the very beginning of its existence, mass media in the Soviet Union were tightly controlled. 
Although the Soviet constitution ostensibly guaranteed citizens freedom of speech, this guarantee was in 
reality circumscribed by the political monopolization of mass media outlets and the belief that freedom of 
expression should be subordinated to the needs of communist construction. The low point of this process 
was reached in the Stalin era when editors and journalists lived in fear of making mistakes.  
 
After Stalin’s death, and especially after Khrushchev’s Secret Speech of 1956, Soviet media 
underwent a marked liberalization, accompanied by widespread recognition that the tired formulae of the 
Stalin era were failing to connect with audiences. This led to a search for new forms of communication 
that would help to mold new citizens. Reformist newspaper editors such as Aleksei Adzhubei had studied 
the forms and practices of American journalism, and sought to create a journalism that would be both 
sensationalistic and transformatory. Adzhubei’s newspapers focused on moral and ethical themes and 
encouraged viewers to come to their own opinions, rather than accepting dogma (Wolfe, 2005). The 
Adzhubei era in the press coincided with the emergence of television as a mass medium. Although 
television was subject to close control, the Communist Party was slow to recognize its potential, which 
meant that supervision was not as close as it would become (Roth-Ey, 2011).  
 
In the second half of the 1960s, controls over media started to tighten once more. Many leading 
newspaper editors were fired and, after the Prague Spring of 1968, media were placed on a tighter leash. 
In 1970, many leading television staff were fired by incoming State TV and Radio Chief Sergei Lapin, 
whose ascent to the leadership coincided with a long period of conservatism (Evans, 2016; Roth-Ey, 
2011). Improvements in recording technology allowed for close supervision of all stages of the production 
process from script to broadcast. Many of the most famous Soviet TV series, such as the iconic 17 
Moments of Spring (Semnadtsat’ mgnovenii vesny, d.Tat’iana Lioznova, 1973), were produced with input 
from important state ministries, including the KGB (Lovell, 2013). Only with the advent of perestroika 
after 1985 did Soviet media move toward loosening controls. This process culminated the end of the state 
broadcasting monopoly (Mickiewicz, 1999), and the new press law of 1990 declared that “censorship of 
the media is not allowed” (SSSR, 1990, p. 1).  
 
Yugoslav media enjoyed significantly more freedom than their Soviet counterparts. Regulatory 
changes introduced over the course of the 1950s and the 1960s reduced party-state control, brought 
greater editorial and organizational independence, and contributed to professionalization (G. S. Robinson, 
1977). Even though similar changes can be identified in other socialist countries, Yugoslav reforms were 
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more far reaching and long lasting. Nonetheless, the levels of control over the media varied considerably 
over time. The 1960s were marked by lower levels of political supervision and a more vibrant public 
culture. As stated in a programmatic document issued in 1965, the media were expected to function not 
only as a means of top-down transmission of information, but as “political fora” designed to encourage 
bottom-up, working-class participation (Archives of Yugoslavia, 1965). These changes were paralleled by a 
rise in critical news commentaries and dedicated radio and television programs discussing contentious 
issues such as living standards, unemployment, and social inequalities (Mihelj, 2013).  
 
Toward the end of the 1960s, public debate in the country became increasingly rife with 
nationalist sentiments. Outbursts of nationalist fervor became particularly acute in the republic of Croatia, 
culminating in a wave of mass protests calling for an independent Croatia in Autumn 1971. This escalation 
prompted the aging Yugoslav President Tito to intervene and initiate a large-scale purge of political, 
media, and cultural elites. Following the purge, political control over the Yugoslav media tightened. Party 
members operating within each media organization were tasked with monitoring the day-to-day work in 
the media, and each broadcasting center was required to produce yearly plans that required multiple 
approvals before being put into practice (Mihelj, 2015).  
 
Political control over the media started to ease following the death of Yugoslavia’s president in 
1980. Although the legal framework remained largely unchanged, the 1980s were characterized by a 
progressive opening of public debate, starting first in literary journals and moving slowly into mainstream 
media, including television. Discussion of topics that had for decades been taboo, including the history of 
interethnic violence between Yugoslav nations during World War II and the notion of Yugoslav brotherhood 
and unity, became more common (Wachtel, 1998). 
 
Apart from acknowledging differences and longitudinal shifts in politics–media dynamics, it is also 
important to note other differences between Soviet and Yugoslav television that may have impacted 
televised representations of privacy in serial fiction. Of particular importance is the openness to foreign 
imports, and specifically imports from the West. As existing research attests (Nordenstreng & Varis, 
1974), the socialist world as a whole was firmly integrated into global circuits, but the countries differed 
significantly in their openness to Western content. Whereas Yugoslav television was among the most open 
to foreign influence and offered audiences a wide range of Western serial fiction, Soviet broadcasters were 
considerably more enclosed and largely reliant on imports from other socialist countries. In such a 
context, it is likely that Yugoslav producers sought to develop their work in conversation with Western 
models, and hence also focused their narratives more often on personal life and domestic dramas, not 
least because imported series of this type were evidently popular among audiences. Indeed, several 
Yugoslav dramas that focused on personal and everyday life—including, for instance, The Whole Life in a 
Year (Čitav život za godinu dana, 1971) and Our Small Town (Naše malo misto, 1970–1971)—were 
compared with Western counterparts, especially the U.S. drama Peyton Place (ABC, 1964–1969). It is 
important to note, however, that Soviet television, despite limited exposure to imports, was not immune 
to the pull of Western models either; shows such as Day After Day were, according to Soviet TV critics, 
modeled on U.S. shows, as well as other socialist dramas (Derevitskii, 1970). Socialist serial drama as a 
whole, therefore, should be seen as an integral part of the transnational circuit of imagery and narratives 
that stretched across the Iron Curtain.  
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It is tempting to argue that the influence of transnational flows from the West contributed to the 
domestic, private-centered nature of socialist serial drama. Yet, as we shall see, serial fiction produced in 
the socialist world depicted privacy in distinct ways. Although the influence of imports may have 
contributed to a greater proportion of dramas set in the private realm in the Yugoslav context, this did not 
mean that the vision of personal life presented in such dramas was a mere copy of Western templates. 
Rather, Yugoslav television professionals engaged in selective appropriation of foreign templates, and 
were harshly condemned in the press if their work was seen to follow Western formats too slavishly. For 
instance, The Whole Life in a Year was criticized for the lack of momentum and for its boring, unrealistic 
dialogues, as well as for failing to offer any valuable lessons about everyday life and human relations. In 
the words of one commentator, the series not only failed to provide a satirical take on the bourgeois 
values of Peyton Place, but was in effect merely an inferior version of the U.S. series (“Peyton ili živ,” 
1971). This suggests that the influence of Western imports did not simply result in the enhanced 
domesticity or intimacy of socialist dramas, but rather provided an impetus for developing a different, 
distinctly socialist vision of domestic life and personal relationships. 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 
The first thing to note when looking at the proportions of different settings is the strikingly low 
percentage of dramas set mostly in domestic settings—14.7% in the Soviet Union and 8.8% in Yugoslavia 
(see Table 1). This result already indicates that socialist broadcasters, although attracted to depictions of 
domesticity, rarely abandoned the public realm altogether, but at the very least (as in the Yugoslav case) 
sought to construct narratives that traversed both domestic and public domains. This is, arguably, more 
consistent with the distinctly hybrid nature of socialist privacy, and would suggest that socialist television, 
rather than fostering a wholesale retreat into privacy, sought to offer narratives that firmly tied domestic 
spaces to the world outside.  
 
Despite this shared trait, differences between the two countries are notable as well. The markedly 
higher proportion of Soviet dramas set in mostly public environments (75.8% as opposed to 35.3%) 
suggests that tighter political control over the media coincides with higher proportions of series set in 
public spaces. This difference is also consistent with Yugoslavia’s greater openness to Western imports, 
and hence possibly greater influence of Western-style serial drama set in domestic spaces. 
  
Table 1. TV Series Settings: Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 1959–1991 (N = 544). 
 Soviet Union Yugoslavia 
Setting n % n % 
Mostly domestic settings 28 14.7 31 8.8 
Domestic and public settings 18 9.5 198 55.9 
Mostly public settings 144 75.8 125 35.3 
Total 190 100.0 354 100.0 
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The analysis of longitudinal trends, however, reveals a more complex picture. In the Soviet 
Union, the period of conservatism brought by Sergei Lapin in 1970 initially went hand-in-hand with a 
decline in the proportion of series set mostly in public settings, which dipped from 80% in 1971 and 100% 
in 1972 to 50% in 1976 (see Figure 1). This seems to confirm the argument that tighter control over 
public space leads to a retreat into domestic space, but this does not hold true for the rest of the period. 
Instead, the proportion of such series returned to its previous high levels already in 1977, and a mild 
decline occurred again only toward the end of the 1980s, at a point when political scrutiny over the media 
began to soften with the arrival of perestroika. At this point, the relationship between political control and 
domestic settings seemed almost the reverse of what was seen in the early 1970s: The relaxation of 
control was accompanied by a resurgence of domesticity. 
 
 
 
Note: 3 per. Mov. Avg. = 3 period moving average (average of previous three years)  
 
Figure 1. Domestic and public settings over time: Soviet Union, 1971–1991 (N = 181). 
 
 In Yugoslavia, the longitudinal analysis reveals a similar pattern (see Figure 2). During the initial 
period of tighter political control in the early to mid-1970s, the majority of series were set mostly in 
domestic settings or in mixed domestic and public settings (the only exception is 1974, which could in part 
be a consequence of the unusually low number of series produced that year—only six). As with Soviet 
series, this seems to suggest a positive relationship between stringent political control and retreat into 
domesticity. However, by 1978, the proportion of series set in mostly public settings had returned to its 
previous high levels. We should also note that the decline in the proportions of series set mostly in public 
settings had started in the late 1960s, during the period of relative liberalization. Likewise, the gradual 
softening of control that started from 1980 onwards was accompanied by a marked decline, rather than a 
rise, in the proportion of series set in public settings.  
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As with settings, the results of plot analysis reveal a rather low proportion of series focused 
exclusively on personal relationships—10.9% in the Soviet Union and 35.8% in Yugoslavia (see Table 2). 
Yet again, we find that socialist broadcasters gave preference to dramas that either eschewed personal 
plots altogether, as in the Soviet case, or combined them with public plots, as in the Yugoslav case.  
 
 
Figure 2. Domestic and public settings over time: Yugoslavia, 1965–1991 (N = 344). 
 
 
As was the case with the settings, the comparison of prevailing plot structures in the two 
countries also reveal notable differences: Consistent with the more relaxed political environment, the 
majority of Yugoslav series includes at least one prominent personal plot (77.1%), whereas the proportion 
of such series in the Soviet context is considerably lower (25.5%). 
 
Table 2. TV Series Plots: Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 1959–1991 (N = 580). 
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Plot n % n % 
Mostly personal 26 10.9 122 35.8 
Personal and public 35 14.6 141 41.3 
Mostly public 178 74.5 78 22.9 
Total 239 100.0 341 100.0 
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However, longitudinal trends again reveal a more complex relationship between plot and political 
context. Much as with public settings, the proportion of Soviet series centered on public plots declined 
through much of the 1970s, reaching its lowest point at 50% in 1977 (see Figure 3). Yet, the proportion of 
series with mostly public plots soon returned to its previous levels, well before any loosening of 
Communist Party control was in sight. The period of perestroika, on the other hand, did not lead to 
marked changes in public plots; if anything, their proportion saw a mild decline.  
 
  
 
Figure 3. Personal and public plots over time: Soviet Union, 1971–1991 (N = 229). 
 
 
In Yugoslavia, the contrast between the early 1970s and the 1980s was even clearer (see Figure 
4). The initial period of tighter controls in the early to mid-1970s coincided with lower proportions of series 
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1970s, and declined (rather than rose) through most of the 1980s, in parallel with the softening of control 
over the media.  
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Figure 4. Personal and public plots over time: Yugoslavia, 1965–1991 (N = 331). 
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last. As our qualitative analysis suggests, this was because fictional representations of domesticity and 
personal relationships proved problematic.  
 
An example of the ambiguous, potentially problematic nature of televised privacy is provided by 
the Soviet series Day After Day, which was written by the playwright and songwriter Mikhail Ancharov. It 
follows the lives of the residents of a communal apartment block in Moscow and focuses on melodramatic 
elements such as romantic relationships, marriage problems, or ongoing health issues. The series is more 
accurately described as a communal drama than a family drama, despite the fact that some characters are 
related. What connects the characters is not blood ties or even the fact that they live in the same 
apartment, but shared values, a shared culture, and a shared way of life. Similar features are found in a 
range of other series broadcast in the same period, many of which received an enthusiastic response 
among both audiences and critics. As archival documents suggest, this turn to personal life was a result of 
concerted political investment in using television as a means of representing the “socialist way of life” 
(Koginov, 1971, p. 3). This investment was closely tied to the policy of “Developed Socialism,” which 
suggested that the country was entering a new stage of its development in which the absence of conflict 
between classes and nations meant that the country could now consolidate its achievements (Brezhnev, 
1971). Among the key implications of the policy was a renewed emphasis on the present day and the well-
being of the citizenry in the here and now. As a result, the Soviet media, including television, turned from 
epic tales of self-sacrificing heroes to stories about ordinary individuals whose main achievement was to 
work hard and care for their families (Huxtable, 2013). 
 
However, a closer analysis of Day After Day suggests that this turn to the ordinary and the 
personal, despite its marked emphasis on shared communal values, was not without problems. First, the 
emphasis on personal matters left little scope for connecting the idealized vision of communal life to any 
recognizable goal of constructing communism. Second, the show was suffused by a nostalgic sense that 
older forms of social unity were disappearing. As noted earlier, the 1960s and the 1970s saw growing 
numbers of Soviet families abandon their communal apartments and move to individual family homes. 
This is also what happens to the characters of Day After Day: The communal apartment building is 
condemned, and the residents—much to their chagrin—are forced to move into separate apartments. In 
other words, although the show provides a positive vision of personal life within which communal values 
are maintained, it is also touched by a sense of doubt: Will it be possible to uphold the genuine 
collectivism and solidarity of communal apartments in an era of family homes, or will the personal 
ultimately overshadow the collective? Perhaps because of these problems, after an initial burst of 
enthusiasm for series dealing with personal life, the emphasis on personal matters was replaced by a 
focus on the individual at work and on action heroes. The remainder of the 1970s and the 1980s was 
marked by a large number of spy thrillers, such as the aforementioned 17 Moments of Spring (1973) and 
historical epics such as The Eternal Call (1976–1984) and State Borders (1980–1988), which meant that 
the key focus of the action was typically the battlefield, the border post, or the workplace.  
 
In Yugoslavia, televised domesticity proved to be even more problematic, although the exact 
reasons differ. On the one hand, narratives of personal life seemed to offer an attractive alternative to 
authors who wanted to steer clear of contentious public topics. As explained by Novak Novak, the 
screenwriter of Theatre in the House, his aim was to offer the audience “pure humor,” without any 
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elements of social satire (Historical Archives of Belgrade, 1972, p. 1). The series, which combined the 
elements of family drama and sitcom, followed the everyday life of an extended family living in an 
apartment block in the Yugoslav capital, and for the first three seasons (broadcast during the 1970s), the 
camera virtually never left the apartment. Given that Novak was known as the writer of several satirical 
television series that openly engaged with the problematic aspects of Yugoslav politics and its economy—
all broadcast before the tightening of political control over the media—this pointed emphasis on pure 
humor and the exclusive spatial focus on the family apartment was noteworthy and can be seen as an 
instance of self-censorship.  
 
As contemporary reviews of the series suggest, the exclusive focus on the domestic sphere was 
not to everyone’s taste, especially given that the plot often revolved around family squabbles over 
finances and tensions between family members and neighbors living in a crowded apartment block—all of 
which could be read as subtle satirical comments on the lack of privacy. According to some commentators, 
the show was “thematically narrow,” its family “too hermetically closed,” and its characters and situations 
too “repetitive” (Historical Archives of Belgrade, 1973, pp. 1–3). In short, Theatre in the House was 
criticized precisely for being too personal, too disengaged from the wider society, and offering little by way 
of a social commentary. In this climate, TV Belgrade seems to have been under pressure to discontinue 
the series. During the airing of the second season and the months that followed, three separate in-depth 
audience studies were conducted to ascertain the views of the audience. Despite overwhelmingly positive 
views, the series was discontinued and returned to Yugoslav screens only in 1980, precisely at the point 
when the party’s grip over the media started to relax. Toward the late 1970s, the proportion of dramas set 
predominantly in domestic spaces or focused on personal plots declined, and Yugoslav screens were 
dominated by serial fiction that either abandoned the private altogether, or—in the majority of cases—
combined it with public spaces and plots: historical epics celebrating the heroic acts of partisan guerrilla 
fighters and their supporters during World War Two, such as Boško Buha (1978–1980), Cat Under the 
Helmet (1978), and The Return of the Outcasts (1976–1978), or series centered on labor and set in 
characteristically socialist workspaces, such as With Full Force (1978, 1980). 
  
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Television may well be an inherently domestic and personal medium, yet the intimate nature of 
television—and of television series, in particular—sat uneasily with the public, collectivist orientation of the 
communist project. As the results presented here demonstrate, socialist broadcasters in Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union largely avoided narratives centered exclusively on private dramas, and instead preferred 
to focus on public plots and spaces or combined both private and public narratives. Although in both 
countries the tightening of political control in the 1970s was initially accompanied by a shift from public to 
domestic settings and personal plots, this retreat into domesticity was short-lived. Television series 
focused on family affairs and friendship and set in communal or family apartments have been popular with 
audiences, but they were out of sync with the public goals of the communist revolution. This is not simply 
because such narratives failed to instill a sense of collective participation in the revolutionary project, or 
because they could not serve as the basis for political mobilization. Rather, the political messages inherent 
in them proved to be potentially antithetical to communist goals and threatened to undermine the 
legitimacy of Communist rule.  
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In the Soviet Union, the idyllic depiction of life in communal apartments in the Soviet serial Day 
After Day celebrated communal values over individual interests, and provided a characteristic example of 
how television could be used to showcase a form of public privacy—that is, a form of domesticity and 
personal relations attuned to the collectivist values of the communist project. Yet, at the same time, the 
series’ nostalgic undertones and the fact that it was broadcast at a time when citizens were increasingly 
abandoning communal homes, suggested a dark side to Soviet development. In Yugoslavia, comic scenes 
of everyday life in crowded apartments and squabbles over family finances in Theatre in the House served 
as reminders of the country’s stagnating economy and of the limits of personal pleasures in a socialist 
country. In both cases, presenting a politically acceptable socialist version of personal, domestic life—one 
that celebrated the collective good and eschewed the need for privacy—turned out to be fraught with 
difficulties. It required either a retreat into a nostalgic vision of a vanishing, idealized past, or a portrayal 
of day-to-day realities that were at least partly inconsistent with the socialist vision. Given such difficulties 
inherent in televised depictions of privacy, it is not a surprise that socialist broadcasters preferred to 
combine private dramas with public plots, or even, as was the case in the Soviet Union, mostly eschewed 
the private and the domestic altogether.  
 
These results have important consequences not only for our understanding of television in state 
socialism, but also for general theories of television. The particular nature of privacy represented in 
socialist TV series suggests that the cultural form of television familiar from the liberal democracies of the 
West underwent important modifications in the state socialist context. It would be worth investigating 
whether other intimate or personal aspects of media content mentioned in literature—its focus on 
nonverbal messages and personality or the illusion of intimacy between the TV personality and the 
spectator—were likewise transformed. This would suggest that we need to acknowledge that the ways in 
which television interacted with the public–private divide differed importantly with context: The socialist 
environment gave rise to a different form of modern television culture, rooted in a distinctly communist 
vision of modern society.  
 
These conclusions fit well with recent debates on modernity and modernization, which no longer 
operate with the notion of a single, universally applicable model of modernity, and have instead accepted 
the notion of multiple modernities, which share a belief in progress but follow different, competing visions 
of what a modern society should entail (e.g., Eisenstadt, 2000; Therborn, 2003). Although television 
cultures both east and west of the Iron Curtain had much in common, they were also drawn into the Cold 
War contest between two rival visions of modernity: one premised on liberal democracy and the market 
economy; the other on Communist rule and the planned economy (cf. Evans, 2016; Gumbert, 2015; Imre, 
2016; Mihelj & Huxtable, 2016). The television formats, modes of engaging the audience, and ways of 
representing social life differed accordingly. In line with this, socialist television needs to be seen as a 
specific subtype of modern television, which was in many ways similar to its Western sibling, but also 
designated to promote an alternative vision of progress and belonging, one rooted in a teleological vision 
of history centered on the revolution and culminating in a socially equal, worker-led society oriented 
toward the collective good. 
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